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Abstract
Over the past six years, the nation has moved rapidly
from punch cards and levers to electronic voting sys-
tems. These new systems have occasionally presented
election officials with puzzling technical irregularities.
The national experience has included unexpected and un-
explained incidents in each phase of the election process:
preparations, balloting, tabulation, and reporting results.
Quick technical or managerial assessment can often iden-
tify the cause of the problem, leading to a simple and
effective solution. But other times, the cause and scope
of anomalies cannot be determined.
In this paper, we describe the application of a model
of forensics to the types of technical incidents that arise
in computer-based voting technologies. We describe the
elements of e-voting that current forensic techniques can
address, as well as the need for a more structured analysis,
and how this can be achieved given modifications to the
design of e-voting systems. We also demonstrate how
some concrete forensic techniques can be utilized today
by election officials and their agents, to understand voting
system events and indicators. We conclude by reviewing
best practices for structuring a formal forensics team, and
suggest legal steps and contractual provisions to undergird
the team’s authority and work.
1 Introduction
Election administrators have been required to manage
rapid changes in voting technology. Even with ample
time, staffing, and technical support, these changes would
present tremendous challenges to the most experienced
administrators. But these resources are typically not avail-
able. And because of incidents such as the alleged multi-
year fraud involving e-voting machines in Kentucky [12],
these problems can no longer be dismissed as theoreti-
cal [22].
This paper considers the problem of forensic exami-
nation of e-voting systems. These reviews occur after
the election, when it has been determined that something
went wrong, or may have gone wrong. We place our
analysis in the framework of a formal model of foren-
sic analysis, Laocoön [31].1 Laocoön uses fault graphs
based on safety properties and security policies to im-
pose a structure on log data. That structure describes the
sequence of steps that take place, and the data that can
be used to show that these steps took place. In this pa-
per, we look at voting systems and address the following
questions, using the framework of our model:
• What questions can a forensic examination answer?
• When should election administrators consider an
election forensic examination?
• How should they prepare for an examination?
• Who should be included on the forensic team?
• What sort of legal, contractual, and practical provi-
sions may be needed?
Equally important is what this paper does not do. This
paper does not study the merits of e-voting, or of specific
types of e-voting systems. It accepts that these systems
exist, and are used, and asks what to do should they fail or
appear to function anomalously. The paper does not ana-
lyze or discuss proposed voting systems (such as Clark-
son’s [14] or Yee’s [39]) because its goal is to discuss
election forensics in the existing election environment,
not in some future environment (although much of the
discussion may apply there). Nor does this paper deal
with specific auditing techniques [16, 19, 23] because its
focus is on how and when to apply those methodologies
and technologies as part of a forensic audit. Auditing tech-
niques may provide an indication that forensic analysis
is necessary and may be useful tools within the forensic
analysis. However, there are many other indicators that
forensic analysis is necessary, and there are many other
useful tools within the forensic analysis.
1/Lay-ah-co-ahn/; who was the Trojan (an ancient detective of sorts)
who recommended not letting the Trojan horse into Troy.
After a discussion of the background, we derive general
questions that a forensic audit would consider from the
objectives of an election. This leads to specific indicators
of possible problems, at a much lower level than the
general questions. Given these precise indicators, we can
then apply our model of forensics to show what data needs
to be collected to enable the forensic audit to succeed, and
conversely, what data that is needed cannot be collected
due to system limitations.
2 Problem Statement
During an election, an optical scanner may fail to read
ballots consistently, or a server may freeze as it tabu-
lates votes. Voting machine memory cards or optical
scan ballots may appear to be missing in the canvass re-
port. During every election cycle, experienced election
administrators around the nation anticipate and success-
fully cope with events like these. But sometimes events
are not amenable to quick resolution. Vote totals cannot
be reconciled, or equipment or software failures recur
without explanation. What happened? Are totals accurate
and complete? Can election officials in good conscience
certify the results of the election before these questions
are answered? Will the public accept the results, knowing
there are unanswered questions about the votes? Should
candidates demand a recount?
The technical explanations needed to answer such ques-
tions lie in the realm of election forensics: the process of
analyzing and discovering the causes and cures of tech-
nical problems that might have an impact on the validity
of the results. If the problems involve computers, then
computer forensics are likely a large part of the expertise
required.
The forensic specialists can be asked to determine the
cause of unexpected computer behavior, whether the vote
totals were affected, and to recover missing or damaged
voting records. They can also provide technical evidence
about the integrity of the voting data.
In this paper, an e-voting system is simply a computer-
based mechanism for conducting part of an election. It
includes DREs with and without voter-verified paper audit
trails, opti-scan systems, election management systems,
and others. The forensic models and framework is similar
for all such systems. However, the specific manner in
which the framework is applied may differ, as it will when
applied to different vendors’ systems.
2.1 VVPATs Are Not Forensic Audit Trails
The goal of Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails (VVPATs) is
an audit trail that can be counted to validate the machine’s
reported results, for example during a routine audit. These
VVPATs do not provide enough information to be com-
puter forensic audit trails [36, 37]. For example, they do
not provide enough information to explain a discrepancy
between electronic (computer-produced) and paper ballot
vote counts. A forensic audit trail (FAT) requires data
such as program traces [27] to answer such questions.
Current e-voting systems do not record sufficient correct
data for most forensic analyses (nor indeed, in most cases,
do standards for producing that data exist [4]). Ideally,
new e-voting systems will record this type of forensic
data, but in such a way as not to violate laws and privacy
concerns [30]. Balancing technical requirements and laws
requires a systematic approach [28] that current e-voting
systems appear to lack.
2.2 What Questions Can a Forensic Exam-
ination Answer?
In theory, an objective forensic examination of an election
can:
• determine causes of unexpected and unexplained
technical issues;
• settle questions triggered by a technical equipment
performance problem, leading to broad acceptance
of the ultimate report of election results;
• reduce or eliminate the need for a complete hand-
count of affected ballots;
• stop wild speculations and the “rumor mill”;
• reduce election litigation; and
• enhance the public’s confidence in the election offi-
cials entrusted to conduct the elections and reduce
reputation injuries fueled by lack of objective infor-
mation.
Many of the most interesting questions are non-
technical, and therefore a forensic examination cannot
answer them. Was the election called correctly? This
is both a legal and tecnical question. Can we correctly
announce the winners now? This is both a legal and polit-
ical question. Should we get rid of these machines or buy
more? This is a question of business judgment. Should we
sue someone? This requires legal, political, and business
judgments. Integrating legal constraints into our forensic
model is in the early stages of research [29], so we focus
only on technical issues.
The forensic examination may answer many technical
questions, such as:
• How many votes did the problem affect (minimum,
maximum, best estimate)?
• How accurate are the (preliminary) canvass totals?
• If the totals are wrong, can the investigation recover
the data (votes) needed to correct the totals?
• Is the computerized voting equipment operating in
accordance with its documentation?
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• Were any procedural guidelines violated that might
have contributed to the cause of the problem?
• Does the problem affect only this jurisdiction, or
might other jurisdictions have the same problem?
• Is there anything that appears to be evidence of neg-
ligence, malfeasance, misuse, or attack?
• What can or should be done to prevent the problem
from recurring, in the short term (in the way of pro-
cedural workarounds) and in the long term (in the
way of software or hardware changes)?
Election officials can use information and results from
the forensic examination to help answer non-technical
questions. They, or others, may ask the team to ob-
tain more detailed information, including whether the
examination discovered anything that might indicate a
significant malfunction of the computer hardware or soft-
ware, a deliberate attempt or successful) to affect the vote
statistics or to interfere with voting, or serious errors in
instruction manuals or documentation.
We begin by identifying the technical safety properties
and security policies (“goals”) that can appear within the
fault graph.
3 When Should Election Officials Consider
a Forensic Examination?
The requirements of an election with which this paper
deals are:
1. Accuracy. The results of the election must reflect
the votes cast, tempered by the requirements of the
relevant laws.
2. Availability. The mechanisms for voting must be
available to the electorate, so that all eligible voters
may vote, and only those eligible voters may vote.
3. Secrecy. No voter may prove to a third party how he
or she voted.
4. Anonymity. A third party cannot associate any par-
ticular ballot with an individual.
A forensic audit, by definition, is invoked when there
appears to be some miscarriage of one or more of these
properties. Any indication that one or more of these
properties may not hold should trigger a forensic audit.
Therefore, specific indicators that a forensic audit is nec-
essary flow from the negation of one or more of the above
requirements. Examples of such indicators follow.
The following problems raise questions about availabil-
ity:
• Repeated “crashes,” “freezes,” or auto-reboots of any
voting system component
• Components that become slower and slower the
longer they are in service
• Unusual episodes of unresponsiveness that last more
than a few seconds
• Failure of some usually reliable functionality
• Unusual or undocumented error messages from the
application software of any component
• Unexplained and undocumented new system behav-
ior, even if it occurs only once
• Failure of a post-election logic and accuracy (L&A)
test of any component (especially if the same com-
ponent passed its pre-election L&A test).
The following problems raise questions about accuracy:
• Any unresolvable failure of vote totals, ballot counts,
or voter counts to properly sum and reconcile with
each other, or with audit trail records
• Unusually high numbers of overvotes, top of ticket
undervotes, write-in votes, or votes for minor candi-
dates or parties
• Vote totals that are obviously too small (or nega-
tive), or obviously too large, even if they appear to
reconcile properly
• Any inexplicable or illogical data (or indicators of
data corruption), including in vote totals, database
time stamps, or automatic audit logs.
The following problems involve both availability and
accuracy:
• Memory cards or cartridges that, when read repeat-
edly, appear to give different results, or read errors
• Memory cards or cartridges that are supposed to be
redundant copies of one another, but do not in fact
contain identical data
• For direct recording electronic (DRE) systems, any
discrepancy at all between the results reported elec-
tronically for a precinct and the results of a hand
count of intact VVPAT records for that same precinct
• For DREs, multiple reinforcing reports of failure of
the votes as recorded on the summary screen to agree
with the voter’s tentative votes or with the VVPAT
• For optical scanners, any batch of paper ballots that,
when read repeatedly by the same or different scan-
ners, yields counts that differ
• For optical scanners, any failure to scan and properly
record the votes of a test deck that contains clean,
correct marks.
• Multiple corroborating reports from voters, poll
workers, or county employees that the voting equip-
ment is not functioning properly (regardless of
whether they explain the problem correctly.
The indicators for violations of anonymity and secrecy
arise in one of two ways. If one looks only at the elec-
tion, ignoring external data such as reports of vote buying
and selling, then violations of these requirements involve
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external markings that enable a ballot to be identified as
unique. In the extreme, a voter may sign his or her ballot
(in practice, this will not work in California, as any ballot
with a signature is not counted), but more likely, a voter
will vote in a particular pattern in some set of races to
identify the ballot uniquely. So, one indicator of viola-
tions of anonymity and secrecy is a pattern of votes in
races that are not duplicated among voters. An easy way
to do this is to write in creative candidate names. Thus,
one specific indicator is a large number of write-in votes,
with each write-in candidate’s name being unique.
Dozens of technical problems, major and minor, can oc-
cur during an election. The specific problems will depend
on the particular voting technology used in the jurisdic-
tion, the vendor, the software version and configuration,
and the kind of election involved (general, primary, spe-
cial, recall, plurality, instant runoff/rank choice, etc.). The
vast majority of technical problems are simple, recogniz-
able, and fairly routine, and can be resolved by standard
procedures such as rebooting, replacing or recalibrating
a piece of hardware, applying documented workarounds
for known problems, or by conducting cross-checks, pre-
election tests, and post-election auditing processes. Such
routine problems are familiar to election officials every-
where and clearly should not trigger any formal exami-
nation in conjunction with an election. However, even in
these cases, officials should save audit logs of appropriate
subject and granularity to help analysts should a foren-
sic audit be triggered, and to help determine whether the
machines can be deemed trustworthy for future elections.
Further, sometimes an event occurs during an election
that is outside the normal range of familiar problems. A
system may crash, or yield inconsistent preliminary elec-
tion results in one or more races. It may simply behave
in an unexpected way not previously seen or documented
(sometimes called an “anomaly”), and perhaps not re-
peatable. In fact, the very non-repeatability of a problem
may itself be a key indicator that something more fun-
damental is wrong. Such unusual or unexpected events
could result from a hardware failure, a ballot definition
error, an operator or poll worker error, a previously un-
known software limitation or bug, or a combination of
such causes. Also, the possibility of election tampering
through either malicious software or direct human alter-
ation of vote totals cannot be casually dismissed. For
example, a voting system problem is often dismissively
described as a “glitch,” “hiccup,” or “computer error.” In
fact, unusual or unexpected events on a voting machine
may indicate a problem, and should be examined.
Whenever a technical issue surfaces with voting equip-
ment, election officials should undertake an inquiry as
to its causes and cures. Even a seemingly small and in-
consequential problem may actually be non-trivial and
deserves examination; after all, in high assurance equip-
ment, any error is cause for concern. Like the proverbial
tip of the iceberg, small problems may be the only ob-
servable signs of large or systemic underlying problems.
Even if the outcome of a particular race does not appear
to depend on resolving the problem, conscientious elec-
tion officials should examine it. This inquiry helps both
the jurisdiction where the irregularity surfaced as well as
other jurisdictions, for often, like icebergs, the underlying
problem is present elsewhere but without visible symp-
toms or indicators—which might mean the problem goes
undetected when it most matters. All unusual or unex-
pected events in voting systems, as in any high reliability,
high security computerized systems, should be examined.
A forensic examination of the computerized voting sys-
tem components related to or potentially affected by the
problem may prove helpful, or necessary, under these
circumstances.
4 Laocoön: A Model of Forensic Logging
We have developed a model of forensic logging, called
Laocoön. Laocoön takes as input a set of security poli-
cies and general information about a system’s architecture,
and gives a set of directives for data to log as outputs, in-
cluding means of logging that data in which unrelated can
be pruned. The result of using the model is that it can aid
in understanding and linking events into steps of a system
failure, and helps to place bounds on the conditions that
lead to an unusual or unexpected step in a failure. The
fault graphs used by Laocoön can be partially derived by
reverse-engineering configured policies ([31], §8.2), and
the conditions describing the graph are translated into
logging requirements. When implemented, the system
can record forensic data at various levels of granularity,
in standardized and parsable formats.
Applying Laocoön to a system does not preclude the
use of a skilled human analyst. Indeed, an analyst is still
necessary to interpret the data. However, by involving the
human analyst in determining what data should be col-
lected, the data is more likely to be present, and of value,
when needed. Further, by using a systematic approach to
instrumenting a system to collect logs, rather than analyz-
ing an ad hoc collection of unrelated logs, not intended
to be used for forensics, the chances of collecting the
necessary data are increased.
The results of experiments that we have previously
applied Laocoön to have shown promise [31, 26], and
thus in this paper, we expand our approach to look at
voting systems. Indeed, voting is in many ways an ideal
approach to this method because in theory, the modes of
operation of the machines are limited, and the security
policies well defined. Indeed, only systems that exhibit
limited operation and well defined policy are appropriate
choices for voting machines.
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a b c d
start of attack unknownintermediate steps
end goals 
of intruder
Figure 1: Diagram of a generic failure or attack where
circles represent actions. A failure model almost always
consists of at least the endpoint (d), but may also include
the beginnings (a) and possibly other states near the end
(c).
The design of an ideal audit system for computer foren-
sics (including, but not limited to e-voting) begins with
requirements. The requirements are translated into poli-
cies and the policies are used to define failure graphs. The
failure graphs are formed by starting with the predefined
policy violations (e.g., a recorded vote changing) and
working backward to the point of “entry” into the system
or the starting trigger of a series of events, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Each node (“goal”) is described by the pre-
conditions required to accomplish an event to achieve the
goal, and the post-conditions of achieving the goal. As
mentioned earlier, we cannot define, let alone enumerate,
all methods of violation. The model tolerates this by us-
ing data about steps toward the policy violation that we
do know something about to place bounds on the steps
that we do not know anything about (Figure 1b). These
fault graphs are then translated into specifications and im-
plementations that Laocoön uses to guide logging—what
data to log and where to place the instrumentation to log
the data. Finally, that data is used by a human analyst
to conduct forensic analysis in a rigorous and systematic
way.
For example, consider how Laocoön would guide the
logging for an analysis of over-voting. Over-voting oc-
curs when a voter selects more candidates than allowed
in a given race. Electronic voting machines generally
prevent voters from over-voting, which means that ballots
recorded with over-votes indicates that the software de-
signed to prevent over-votes failed, leading to a forensic
audit. Such an event could ultimately be recorded in a lim-
ited number of ways, either on a VVPAT or on electronic
media. At some point, the value of a variable or a (set of)
bit(s) changes somewhere. This requires the manipulation
of a limited number of data points. We need not describe
in advance how the data is manipulated (and in fact this
may be impossible). It is sufficient to understand the
possible paths that lead to this manipulation. The paths
begin at entry into the system (e.g., touchscreen, super-
visor machine, hardware manipulation) and end at the
data. In between represent events such as specific library
calls or system calls. The paths in between the endpoints
must be monitored (e.g., via kernel modifications or vir-
tual machine introspection). This automatically places
bounds on the intermediate steps in the path. This allows
a system to collect enough information for a forensic an-
alyst to analyze the violation—the traversal of that fault
graph—and either understand what happened, or deter-
mine how to analyze the system further to obtain any
necessary information.
Unfortunately, most of the time, systems do not record
sufficient data to validate the correct operation of an elec-
tronic voting machine, or to determine the cause of incor-
rect operation, when an anomaly is discovered. There are
at least two consequences of this: first, machines that do
log the necessary information can be created by apply-
ing the model during the design phase. Second, we can
identify points in the election process at which additional
(or better) data may provide information enabling the
analysts to determine which among multiple causes and
effects are the causes and effects of the aberrations noted.
This is an advantage of applying the model because it can
remind analysts (and therefore also election officials and
ultimately the public) not to draw conclusions too quickly,
since other possibilities may exist. For example, exam-
iners of the Sarasota, Florida, election for Congressional
District 13 in 2006 never proved what happened to the
18,000 missing votes. They were able to eliminate some
possibilities, but the question still remains whether the
problem was poor ballot design or something else.
5 Application of Laocoön
In this section, we describe how to apply Laocoön to
obtain detailed information about what data the foren-
sic audit will require. Critical to the analysis is that the
data be meaningful, that is, it provides the information
expected; and that the data be assured, that is, preserved
accurately. We deal first with meaningful data. We then
focus on its assurance.
5.1 What Data to Preserve
We now apply Laocoön as a framework for analysis, be-
ginning with voting machine requirements. Much of the
data to be preserved covers multiple requirements. For
example, the memory cards used in the systems may pro-
vide information dealing both with availability (memory
cards with dirty connectors causing intermittent failures)
and accuracy (memory cards with bad memory causing
5
errors in recording votes). In what follows, we associate
components with indicators.
Repeated crashes, freezes, or auto-reboots may indicate
a failure within the system, and describe a goal state of
the fault graph. Therefore, the model states that data to
describe the system and the failure should be recorded.
Thus:
Rule P1. Record the indications of any failure—what
happened, when it happened (specifically at which
step in the voting process), any error indicators such
as a message on the screen, and so forth.
This includes system level events as well as human
events, such as someone using the machine. For example,
if a possible failure includes a shutdown, then record the
programs or commands capable of issuing a shutdown. If
a failure includes wiping the memory of the system, then
record commands capable of performing such deletions,
as well as the permissions used to issue the command.
Likewise, starting at the beginning of the fault graph
(rather than the end goal states) suggests:
Rule P2. Record information about the entry points
into the system, including the locations from which
people accessed the system (for example, through the
voter interface or by opening bays for maintenance).
That must include non-voters, such as election officials,
delivery personnel, and voting system vendor employees.
It also includes visual descriptions of the state of the entry
points, including any available screen shots. For example,
since lightening strikes, floods, or someone tripping over
a power cord can clearly result in a system failure, record
environmental data: location of power cords, weather
(detailed records of temperature and humidity and other
factors).
As part of Laocoön, one must analyze the set of possi-
ble paths from the initial states of the graph to the terminal
(error) states. This requires more data:
Rule P3. Collect any external data relevant to the
state of the voting system.
Obvious examples are VVPATs, audit logs, memory
cards and other removable peripherals such as USB sticks
and cables indicating connections to telephone lines or
networks. Anything recording the externals of the system,
such as videotapes from security cameras, will prove
useful. Finally, people are an excellent resource here
because they may have information and not realize it. So
note (and possibly interview) poll workers who set up
the machine, and the number of voters who interacted
with it (e.g., from poll books). Chain of custody details
for the voting machine and peripherals from when they
were initialized will provide more information, as will
records of tamper-evident seal numbers (and of course
any breaking of those seals).
When components (such as VVPAT printers) become
slower or exhibit episodes of non-responsiveness, the
same elements that would be recorded for the primary
system should be recorded for the component attached
to the system. This includes any modification or replace-
ment of a particular component attached to the primary
machine. Also record the reason, if known (for example,
the primary is non-functional, or the thermal VVPAT tape
was adjusted, jammed, or had to be replaced).
When discrepancies occur in the totaling of votes, the
fault graph developed using Laocoön shows the paths that
lead to those end points. To select among these paths,
data needed includes the records of how many ballots
were cast, spoiled, and provided to the polling stations;
“zero tapes” that suggest whether the e-voting systems had
any votes on them before the polls opened; the end-of-day
tally sheets and signed poll-worker records indicating how
many voters came. Additional data comes by eliminating
potential initial points. Among the data to do this is the
chain of custody for all devices and storage media in the
path that the ballot takes—this includes the system on
which votes are cast and the memory recording the votes
cast. This also includes details about the e-voting device
itself so that officials can determine if the problem is
confined to a precinct, a race, a single party in a primary
election, one jurisdiction, or a particular machine or a
particular type of machine. For example, if it occurred
in only one race, then the problem is likely related to
some attribute of either the race (perhaps many voters
did not want to vote for some unexplained reason), the
ballot layout (perhaps many voters missed seeing the race
on the ballot), or the systems used (perhaps touching the
location of the race on the screen triggered a bug in the
firmware that caused the vote not to be recorded).
If concerns about secrecy and anonymity arise,
Laocoön suggests looking for anything that identifies
the ballot uniquely, and that associates it with the voter.
Thus, any unique item or number or code being given
to the voter will prove helpful and should be recorded
(not what it is, though—otherwise the forensic audit it-
self compromises secrecy and anonymity). Similarly,
patterns in ballots as discussed above make the ballot
uniquely idenifiable, so ballots as a whole should be pre-
served. (In California, provisional ballots may not be
cast electronically. Otherwise the names associated with
them—for determining the legitimacy and/or legality of
the vote—also reflect a method for compromising secrecy
and anonymity.) The dissemination of such unique identi-
fication can be used to trace its use later in the fault graph
by looking through logs for evidence of communication
of the unique identification. In this context, examining
the physical layout of the location of the voting system
may prove fruitful, because some voting systems emit
audio signals that an attacker can capture remotely [7].
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Equally critical is:
Rule P4. Record any signs that the data is incomplete
or may not be trustworthy.
For example, if the system is supposed to record every
occurrence of a particular event but does so only intermit-
tently, that indicates a problem that may interfere with the
correct operation of the system, and almost certainly will
interfere with the forensic analysis of that system. We
now examine this point in more detail.
5.2 Assurance and How to Preserve the
Data
Forensic analysts can draw credible conclusions only
from trustworthy forensic data. This property is assur-
ance—confidence that the data meets a set of require-
ments “based on specific evidence provided by the ap-
plication of assurance techniques” ([6], §18, p. 478). In
this case, the requirements are that the data accurately
reflects the state of the system when it is recorded, and
the data is not changed from the time of recording to the
time it is used in the forensic analysis. It also reflects that
the forensic log data can be mapped back to the system’s
design specification to determine where—and possibly
how—the system may have deviated from its intended
operation.
The first requirement speaks to the integrity of the
system and what the data being saved represents. As
previously argued [30], existing e-voting systems do not
generate forensic information. Therefore, the forensic
analysts must try to deduce information from the recorded
inputs and outputs of the system, knowing how the system
works.
In technical terms, Laocoön requires that the data be
recorded at failure points, both temporally and as close as
possible to the artifact that fails. This translates into the
procedural rule:
Rule A1. Preserve all artifacts as soon as the problem
is discovered, in the state in which the problem was
discovered.
In practice, if the problem occurs during the election,
officials must continue to use the equipment because they
cannot stop the election. In that case, copies of the data
on the equipment—for example, making clones and/or
backups down to the contents of the disks and memory
(because some tests and analyses will destroy data in
memory or on disk)—will preserve much of the infor-
mation for the examiners. Where circumstances prevent
freezing or capturing the evidence (such as an error mes-
sage), a digital photograph will help document events and
contexts for later use.
Preserve all voting system equipment, including the
precinct devices (e-voting machines, printers, monitors,
registration check-in devices, etc.) as well as county-level
devices (card readers, ballot counting devices, servers)
until the examiners and officials determine the scope of
the review. Further, if a computer or device involved in the
election is running at the time the problem was discovered,
it is best for the examination if it is left running so that,
for example, examiners can determine what software was
running when the problem was discovered. If the device
or computer was off when the problem appeared, it should
be left off.
If the machines are connected to a network, forensic
experts will decide what to connect to, or disconnect from,
the network. The network containing machines involved
in the election should not be altered [25]. If this is not pos-
sible because, for example, the machines are at a polling
station, officials should keep detailed records of what staff
did and any events that occurred after the problem was
discovered. The physical environment in which the equip-
ment was located should be left undisturbed or, if that is
not possible, photographs and measurements should be
taken.
Maintaining the provenance of these artifacts becomes
critical. Especially in a situation as volatile as an election,
observers may want (or need) to validate the examin-
ers’ conclusions. If the preservation of the evidence is
questionable, then the results of any forensic examination
relying on their data also becomes questionable, by Biba’s
model [5] and Rivest and Wack’s notion of “software inde-
pendence” [33]. Thus, minimizing the handling of these
artifacts, and tracking their chain of custody, provides a
basis for assessing the trustworthiness of the transmission
of the artifacts.
Rule A2. Election officials must have a process docu-
menting how to handle potential evidence.
If people do not believe the evidence has been pre-
served, they will question the validity of the examina-
tion’s conclusions. Here, the “chain of custody” records
figure prominently. In a forensic examination, by apply-
ing Laocoön to humans, one can map the chain of custody
records both to other observations from humans (“when I
first saw the machine, it had blue tamperproof tape, and
now it’s red”) as well as to forensic logs. In addition, no
one should ever be left alone with potential evidence in-
cluding chain of custody records. This “two-person rule”
means that at least two people can vouch for the accuracy
of the chain of custody records. This rule applies to origi-
nal evidence; of course, one person can handle copies of
evidence alone. Ideally, some technical measures would
make evidence tamper-evident (e.g., cryptographic hashes
on log data [34]) or fault tolerant (e.g., streaming to a sep-
arate system [40], perhaps in a separate security domain).
However, systems currently do not have such measures, so
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the human procedural steps are necessary. In most cases,
the integrity of the data will be the only constraint, but
depending on the type of data, privacy may require con-
fidentiality. In those cases, officials and examiners must
disclose the reasons for keeping some of the evidence
confidential, and the basis for selecting the evidence to
be kept confidential.
Rule A3. Potential evidence should be frozen and se-
cured.
Once it is clear a forensic inquiry will be convened,
only forensic examiners should touch any of the equip-
ment or files. Everything connected with the election
should be frozen and maintained as close as possible
to the state it was in when the problem was discovered.
Preserving the environment and materials extends to the
computer environment. No personnel should create, open,
edit, or delete files, run programs, log in or log out. Fur-
ther, this all must be observable so the public can see the
rules are being followed.
The next two rules are related:
Rule A4. The process for preserving evidence must
be public.
and
Rule A5. The methodology and results of the forensic
examination must be public.
The level of assurance is determined by evidence that
convinces those who require the assurance. As elections
are held so that the public at large may determine the win-
ners, the public is the body that must assess the assurance
of the process of forensic examination. If an examina-
tion is conducted in secret, often the public response is
to doubt its results, regardless of how well the evidence
was preserved. Elections in the United States are tradi-
tionally conducted openly, with a minimum of secrecy
(for example, in some states, observers can view every
step of the process except the voter casting her votes
in the booth). This expectation of openness naturally
extends to examinations of equipment issues that could
affect election results. Thus, the public should be able to
observe all activities before and during the examination.
Of course, this openness needs to be balanced with the
need to maintain the confidentiality of examiners’ discus-
sions as they are conducting the review, and to protect
the vendors’ proprietary information. For example, the
California Top-to-Bottom Review [7, 11] used cameras
to broadcast video to a public area apart from the secured
facility where the “red team” analysis was conducted.
However, no audio was broadcast. Any member of the
public could thus come to watch the examination—and
the examiners could speak freely about confidential in-
formation and their testing and preliminary conclusions,
without premature disclosures.
In addition, the composition of the team and the condi-
tions under which they work are important. The following
flows directly from the above five rules.
5.2.1 Providing a Facility
Depending on the scope of the forensic examination, the
team may need to work at a physical facility with con-
trolled access, such as a conference room or some office
space that can be locked and has alarms. The members of
the forensic team must control who is allowed to access
that space. It will need to be large enough to house:
• Paper and other physical evidence
• The computers involved in the examination; the team
can determine whether all computers need to be
housed in the space concurrently
• Any other equipment relevant to the examination or
that the team needs (for example, cameras, recorders,
printers, laptops, etc.)
• The people on the team, as well as any other autho-
rized personnel such as observers.
The team will need an office safe to lock sensitive material
such as notes, disks, and laptops when their protocol
requires it, or when no one is present. Past examinations
have found something on the order of eight cubic feet of
locked space to be adequate.
Within the secured space, the team will need access
to the Internet for sending and receiving email and for
making Web searches (which can be helpful when con-
ducting forensic analysis). Under no circumstances will
they connect any voting system component to the Internet.
No voting system component should ever be connected to
the Internet, even during forensic examination. Depend-
ing on the type of problem, the forensic team may need
to connect the voting system components to one another
or to their own computers for diagnostics, which will re-
quire one or more internal networks within the secured
space. The best way to guarantee network security in the
secured space is by keeping all other networks physically
separated from the one connected to the Internet.
5.2.2 Team Organization and Size
Depending on how many different types of devices or
how much software is involved, some inquiries may need
more people, more time, or consultation with other ex-
perts. Many technical issues, perhaps most, are caused
at least in part by the failure to follow some procedural
requirement for setting up and using the computer-based
equipment. Thus, except when unusually complex events
occur, a team of two to four people will usually suffice
but they all must bring special expertise to the project.
Occasionally only one well-versed individual has been
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contractually brought in for a forensics review—for ex-
ample, a computer science professor with experience in
voting systems who was supported by graduate students.
Normally, team members will be a group of individuals
recruited by a project leader appointed to head the inquiry
[7, 38, 35, 13, 15], or from a single firm [32] contracted
for the purpose of the inquiry.
5.2.3 Technical Qualifications
A good team brings a special set of talents and skills
unusual even among experienced programmers. Team
members will need to learn their way around a complex
system that not only did they not help build, but may have
never previously seen, and in a very limited time. They
will have to quickly discern the design principles and con-
ventions used in building the software and hardware, and
its likely strengths and weaknesses. There is always the
possibility that a deliberate attack by either outsiders or
insiders [8, 9] caused the anomaly. Only an expert will
have the knowledge and tools to determine what happened
in those cases. Business, educational and other govern-
mental entities’ computers have become frequent targets
for attacks, and this possibility also exists for elections.
All types and components of electronic voting systems,
including optical scanners, DREs, automated ballot mark-
ing devices, and their election management software, are
complex computer systems. They use a wide variety of
technologies such as memory, operating systems, applica-
tions software, programming tools, databases, and secu-
rity and cryptography. Obtaining a correct architectural
and operational understanding of how they work together
is the grounding for the forensic examination. The nature
of these software programs greatly complicates a team’s
quick grasp because these large programs are usually writ-
ten in pieces, at different times, by different people, in
different programming languages, and use specialized
technologies.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the concept of vot-
ing, a computer-based voting system is actually extremely
complex technically, far beyond what most people, even
highly experienced elections officials, are likely to appre-
ciate. A DRE may contain as much as 300,000 lines of
software code. The canvass server, with its operating sys-
tem, database system, and election management system,
has considerably more lines of code controlling its activ-
ities. All of this code is woven together from modules
written at different times by different people in different
programming languages.
To obtain this system comprehension, the team must
have the capacity to read and analyze the systems’ source
code, and from that determine the functionality of the
system. At least one—preferably two—team members
must be experts in computer security and forensic anal-
ysis. Understanding most common error messages and
familiarity with most common forensic tools simply is
not enough [29]. It is not necessary, or sufficient, for the
team members to be “certified” by various companies or
institutes such as CISSP, GIAC, or SANS. But the team
must know, or be able to learn quickly, how to set up
the systems in question, and how they could be set up in
other ways (this will help them uncover problems aris-
ing from not following recommended set-up procedures);
how to recover deleted files; and how to make copies of
the systems’ memories and disks without disturbing the
contents of the original memory and disks in any way.
As an example, for Windows-based election management
systems and canvass servers, the team will need to access
the multiplicity of logs that Windows keeps. As another
example, the team may have to set up tests to analyze the
voting system software and observe its execution in order
to test possible causes of the problem. This would be
done on copies of the systems, not on the actual systems.
A good forensic team can perform these tasks.
To conduct these analyses, at least one team member
should know the architecture of one or more voting sys-
tems. Individuals who have participated in reviews of
these systems, or who have studied reports describing the
architecture, source code, operations, and vulnerabilities
of deployed voting systems, or who have co-authored
these reports, will provide significant insights into the
use and examination of these systems. They will be able
to use their experience and knowledge to diagnose prob-
lems and identify solutions more quickly than examiners
without this experience and knowledge. But other com-
puter scientists, software engineers, or computer security
and forensics firms could get up to speed by studying the
published voting systems studies (see Appendix 2).
Finally, at least one team member must have exper-
tise in election administration and procedures. Election
management is a legally intensive and unusually complex
set of time-bound interconnecting processes that must se-
quence almost perfectly for the election to be conducted
successfully. As officials know, ballots and voting ma-
chines must be properly configured, tested, and delivered
on time, with poll workers properly trained, voting lo-
cations open on time, tabulation equipment functioning
properly, and all memory media and voting data returned
promptly—and each of these tasks requires a myriad of
subtasks to complete in sequence. Normally, an election
forensic examination is also conducted under severe time
pressures, and there will be little time to explain and bring
team members up to speed in the nuances involved in
election administration. With a team member well versed
on these essential administrative points, the review can be
conducted far more quickly.
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5.2.4 Non-Technical Qualifications
As with examiners or auditors in any other field, at least
three qualities are essential: objectivity, the freedom and
willingness to follow the inquiry wherever it goes, and the
ability to describe the causes of the problem completely
and accurately without regard to potential organizational
embarrassment. In sum, the forensic team must have
independence.
Strong ethics are essential: the forensic team members
must have neither conflicts of interest nor the appearance
of conflicts of interest. If at all possible, they should be
entirely disinterested in the results of the election being
examined. If that is not possible, the forensic examiners
must be able to set aside their interests and undertake
the examination without bias. Otherwise, the results will
not receive the trust and legitimacy needed by all parties,
including the public.
The need for independence and avoidance of conflicts
of interest leads to the necessity of excluding from the
forensic team governmental IT employees (county or
State) and representatives from the voting system vendor.
The county or election office IT personnel who helped
run the election, and the vendor technical representatives
who know the systems intimately, are crucial resources
for the forensic team, but their role must be limited to
providing information to the independent forensic team.
This role is discussed in more detail below.
Finally, the team members must be persons of high
integrity and good judgment, and must not be associated
with any partisan organization involved in the election.
There may be a great deal at stake in the resolution of an
election problem. The outcome of important races may
hinge on the results of the inquiry. The problem may
have besmirched the reputations of election officials, the
vendor, and other participants. The problem may have
shaken the public’s confidence in the election. The mem-
bers of the team must have the temperament to be rational,
fair, and restrained in their demeanor when writing and
speaking about the examination. They need to be able
to put aside any opinions in order to find the truth in the
inquiry, wherever it lies.
5.2.5 The Role of the Vendor
Cooperation of the election systems vendor is critical to
the examination’s success and credibility. The vendor
can promote a positive public perception of its company
despite the technical problem if it fulfills its unique role
as a resource and support for the team. However, a ven-
dor should be considered no more special than any other
poll worker or election official. For example, under no
circumstances should an election jurisdiction forego a
forensic analysis of a problematic election because the
voting equipment vendor opposed it or suggested an ex-
planation for the problem. Nor should the vendor apply
pressure on a jurisdiction to accept its explanation and by-
pass having its hypothesis independently confirmed. The
“two-person rule” rule mentioned above must be applied
to the vendor, like everyone else.
Though the vendor is critical to the success of the foren-
sic review, the public agency must not allow the equip-
ment vendor to appoint any examination team members.
The basic rule is: the vendor must be a resource for the
team, but must not conduct or participate in conducting
the examination [3, 21]. Four important reasons lead to
this conclusion:
First, the vendor is a privileged insider. Its in-depth
knowledge of the systems will be valuable. But that can
also represent a threat based on their knowledge of the
system and access to it. Thus, as both our model of
faults and attacks, and our models of insiders and “in-
siderness” [8, 9] suggest, the vendor should understand
the possible entry points to a voting system at least as
well as anyone else. Any procedure (e.g., hardware instal-
lation/removal or software command) suggested by the
vendor should be carefully considered by the forensics
team and carefully documented.
Second, forensics team members must approach the
examination with no preliminary conclusions of what
caused the problem. In practice, this means they must be
prepared to follow the evidence. An examiner who has a
“pretty good idea” of what happened, and why, before the
investigation begins may be predisposed to overlook and
misinterpret data. The vendor representatives are likely
to focus on causes unrelated to problems in the vendor’s
products or recommended procedures. But a vendor can
and should communicate its hypotheses to the team, so the
team can determine how and to what degree they should
explore these ideas.
Third, voting equipment vendors have a direct conflict
of interest. Certain types of diagnoses and conclusions
will not assist the financial interests of the vendor. Thus,
the human and business tendency is to try to identify some
explanation other than, or in addition to, equipment prob-
lems. In some cases, the equipment will be blameless, but
in others some aspect of the vendor’s activities—perhaps
in programming, or in supplying correct documentation—
it will have played a major role in the technical disruption.
The examination should not be biased either way. If a
vendor conducts the examination, a significant portion
of the voting public will not respect the examination’s
conclusion despite ample supporting evidence simply be-
cause of the financial conflict of interest. The presence of
this conflict taints the integrity of both the examination
and the people who selected the examiners. It is better to
avoid the problem by having an arm’s-length examination.
Fourth, the vendor plays a critical role as an informa-
tion resource. The examiners will need to learn exactly
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how the specific equipment is set up, how it is operated,
and how the software works. Often, a day spent talking
with the vendor personnel can give the team insights that
will speed the investigation greatly. We emphasize that
the purpose of this vendor communication is to guide the
examiners’ understanding of the system and its use, and
only that. The vendor should endeavor to fulfill this vital
role that it uniquely holds.
The team’s communication with the vendor must be
handled carefully, to preserve the public perception of the
integrity of the examination, as well as its actual integrity.
The team must be free to communicate with the vendor for
technical information, but if at all possible the convener-
sponsor of the examination should also be present. If the
vendor wishes to communicate with the team, it should do
so through the sponsor and not contact the team directly.
This arm’s-length relationship may seem extreme, but it
prevents the vendor from applying any pressure on the
examiners and further promotes the review’s integrity.
The vendor must be allowed to respond to the forensic
examination team’s report. The vendor response must
be separate from the examiners’ report, to emphasize the
independence of the investigation. Whether the vendor’s
response is to be made after the examiners’ report is pub-
licly issued (as was done in the California Top-to-Bottom
Review [7]), or whether it is to be given to the examiners
before their draft is made public so the team can take
the vendor’s comments into account (as was done with
the RABA review [32]), is something to be decided and
recorded contractually. The advantage of the former is
that the public will understand the vendor played little to
no role in the investigation; the advantage to the latter is
that possible factual errors (such as erroneous informa-
tion from second hand information) can be identified and
more fully researched so the final report is completely ac-
curate. As long as the team’s independence and integrity
is not simply assured, but also perceived as assured, either
method works.
The vendor is a critical and key resource for the ex-
amination, and must be engaged to provide the examin-
ers with technical and procedural information about the
equipment and how to use it. If the vendor promptly and
completely supports the examination, the vendor will be,
and will be seen to be, an asset to the examination. It can
credibly present itself as a company concerned about the
quality of its products, their correct use, and the larger
public trust embedded in the elections process.
6 Legal, Contractual and Practical Issues
6.1 Overview
Voters place great importance on the integrity of their
election processes. So election officials provide the best
assurance to the public when they take an immediate,
vigorous public stance detailing the steps to examine the
technical irregularity and its impact ([21], Appendix A-
1, p. 371). Yet before forensic examiners can begin
work, contractual and legal issues must be resolved. If
the outcome of an election hangs in the balance, delaying
the evaluation by even one week can be too long.
The best plan is to prepare in advance a sample set
of fair and responsible contractual terms for a forensic
inquiry [7]. The contractual issues are generally similar
whether the forensic team is from a private firm or is a
team of independent scientific experts, regardless of who
retained the examiners (e.g., county election officials,
a Secretary of State, a court, or some other authority).
The following discussion simply provides an overview of
some contractual and legal issues that will arise. It is not
intended to provide legal advice or an exhaustive review
of all the law that may govern or the legal issues that could
arise; for such, legal counsel should be sought. Its length
derives from a desire to help others avoid the weeks of
difficult contractual negotiations that have delayed some
previous examinations.
6.2 Preparation and Stakeholders
In a small local election, county election officials may be
the sole decision-makers of whether to convene a foren-
sic inquiry. In federal elections, such as the presidential
election, the decision over what type of inquiry and what
credentials team members need will often involve national
political parties, presidential candidates, the Secretary of
State (or other chief State election officer) along with the
State Attorney General and county attorneys, all negotiat-
ing a process for forensic review. This wide involvement
owes in part to the legal fact that our elections are con-
ducted under an interwoven fabric of Federal and State
law and are intensely political processes.
The importance of elections and their relation to con-
trol over the levers of power can lead to the remote pos-
sibility that prosecutors of either (or both) Federal or
State/county government will intercede where unusual
technical events occur, perhaps to attempt to block an ex-
amination convened by the local officials. The increasing
frequency of documented unexpected technical events,
however, actually tends to reduce the likelihood of prose-
cutors becoming centrally involved, an ironic silver lining
for public transparency. When prosecutors move in and
assume investigatory control, closing out public access
and transparency, the rumor mill and conspiracy theories
often take over. Public confidence in the integrity of the
election and its administrators can plummet even if later
the officials are exonerated.
Fortunately, most prosecutors have sufficient experi-
ence with computers and computer forensics to know that
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computers are far from infallible and that technical irreg-
ularities during elections are far more likely to occur for
reasons such as programming errors rather than deliber-
ate cyber attack or criminal conduct somewhere within
the election administrative system. Knowing the public’s
inferences—of presuming criminal conduct when formal
prosecutorial investigations commence—prosecutors may
rather choose to seek involvement in helping to structure a
qualified independent forensic examination whose report
will also come to their office as well as to the election
officials and public. Further, they may seek an informal
or formal agreement concerning the handling of evidence
(ensuring that if evidence suggesting deliberate wrongdo-
ing is discovered, it will be preserved in a legally sound
manner), and the duties of examiners to report potential
wrongdoing.
Regardless which stakeholders seek to play a role in de-
termining the scope and composition of a forensic inquiry,
election officials will want to ensure that they are fulfill-
ing all obligations imposed on them by law, including any
fiduciary duties for assuring an accurate election.
6.3 Timeline, Authority, Scope, and Public
Relations
Timeline: In most election forensics examinations, the
resource in shortest supply will be time—especially if the
outcome of a race is in question. Forensic examinations
frequently take several weeks; particularly difficult ones
may take two months. It is essential to plan to devote
the time (and funds) needed for a quality review. A good
forensic team may decline the job if the schedule is too
compressed for the job to be done properly. If the outcome
of a race is in question, a target date should be set in
the contract for completing the examination, with some
flexibility for adjustments. If no race results are drawn
into question, it may be possible to have a more open-
ended examination in which the timeline remains flexible
according to what is found.
Authority: Election officials possess legal authority
over the election equipment and materials. But a court,
prosecutor, or legislative inquiry might displace their
role [1]. It is understandable that government officials
will want to be involved and remain informed throughout
the process since they have the ultimate responsibility for
the proper conduct of the election. But the forensic team
needs freedom to act within its charge according to its
own direction and schedule. It also needs to be able to
ask questions of anyone who might be able to provide in-
formation, including election officials, vendor employees,
poll workers, and even voters. These access points for
relevant evidence need to be stated contractually.
Scope: All parties will need to agree on the goals and
parameters of the examination—what they can and cannot
do. That way, all parties are likely to understand their re-
spective tasks and responsibilities. Experience has shown
that examinations have difficulties when these parameters
and goals are not agreed to before the team begins its
work. But the scope of a legitimate forensic examination
has to be very wide and open-ended. If a forensic exami-
nation is called for at all, the problem by definition defied
easy explanations and diagnoses. The examiners must
not be limited, for example, to examining the hardware
or software of just one component of the system, nor can
any component be excluded from examination; once the
review is underway, however, and initial diagnostics are
complete, reviewers can often narrow the scope and not
need to review all components.
Within reason, the team needs the authority to go wher-
ever the examination leads. In the course of their examina-
tion, the examiners may come across potential problems
in the voting system that in the end are not related to the
problem that prompted the examination but which had
to be pursued until they could be eliminated as a con-
tributing cause. While the forensic team should generally
stay within the scope originally assigned, the contract
should specify that they must report significant flaws or
vulnerabilities they happen to discover in the course of
their work whether within the scope definition or not. The
scope’s limitations can also be stated, such as if evidence
of malicious code or other attacks is found, the team is to
notify the legal counsel or the prosecutor’s office that the
jurisdiction has designated.
Public relations: The public has a legitimate strong
interest in election accuracy and thus in obtaining knowl-
edge of the outcome of forensic examinations. In the elec-
tion context, for efficient and accurate communications,
the contract will specify a single point for communication
on both the examination team and the convening govern-
ment entity to which the team will report. An update
frequency might be specified, including whether the team
spokesperson will be expected to communicate directly
with the public via media events after the report has been
submitted. This agreement should balance the need of the
examiners for freedom from interference, and the needs
of the candidates, the vendor, and the public to follow the
examination’s progress and learn its results.
6.4 Indemnity, Nondisclosure, Statutory
Barriers, and More
Indemnification and Costs of Defense: A settled part
of agency law requires indemnification of agents for rea-
sonable costs incurred that are attributable to the agreed
work [2]. Like other agents, the forensic examiners will
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expect to be shielded from any lawsuits that might result
from their work, provided their reports are not slander-
ous and they obey the other contractual clauses. Quite
often, this protection can be provided easily by explicitly
stating that the forensic examiners are acting as agents
of the county or State government [38] that conducted
the election and that costs of defense will be assumed
by the government entity. Under some State procedures,
the forensic examiners may be protected as agents of a
court that orders the forensic examination. The lawyers
for the election jurisdiction that retains the team will need
to research and provide fair indemnification and cost of
defense terms, for without it the effort to recruit qualified
professionals can be severely impeded.
Nondisclosure Agreements (NDAs): Often, a voting
system vendor and the government agencies that procured
the equipment have agreed to be covered by a nondisclo-
sure agreement. Leaving aside the question of whether
there should be NDAs for publicly deployed voting sys-
tem technology, such terms are a part of some procure-
ment contracts. It may be necessary that these NDAs
be extended to cover the forensic examiners. The foren-
sic team or their firm will usually be willing to sign a
narrowly drawn, limited NDA to protect the intellectual
property of the vendor that is not within the public domain.
(Appendix 1 provides an example.) But most experienced
forensic teams will refuse to sign any broadly worded,
unbounded NDA since it may expose them to unnecessary
liability and could impede the forensic examination report
and conclusions from becoming public. If, as has occa-
sionally occurred, a vendor objects to anyone other than
the government employees of the election jurisdiction
conducting the examination and claims that an existing
NDA bars such access for retained experts, the contractual
classification of the team members as the jurisdiction’s
“agents” is often enough to eliminate any difference in
access between the team and employees. In the next gen-
eration of voting equipment procurements, purchasers
would be wise to include provisions specifically autho-
rizing forensic examinations and the NDA terms, if any,
when officials choose to convene an inquiry.
Confidentiality and publication: The public has a
strong interest in the publication of a detailed report on
the team’s findings. The only information that normally
should be withheld in the published forensic examination
report is information that either: (a) is legitimately pro-
prietary to the vendor and not in the public domain or
available beyond the vendor’s personnel, or (b) concerns
specific details of security vulnerabilities that might be ex-
ploitable in an election in the near future, before the prob-
lem can be corrected. The exploitable details of security
vulnerabilities should be written up in a separate report
that is not made public, but the recipients and protections
for this confidential report should be described in the con-
tract. The scope of “proprietary information” should be
defined so that it cannot be interpreted to bar from public
access the forensic examination’s general findings. One
approach would be to incorporate by reference the “in-
dustry standard” of disclosure that the California, Florida,
and Ohio Secretaries of State and vendors agreed to in the
reports under those offices’ sponsorship (see Appendix 1).
An additional clause to promote the larger public interest
in the availability of important information would specify
the public agencies to which the report will be submit-
ted, including, for instance, the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), National Association of State Elec-
tion Directors (NASED), and the State’s chief election
officer.
Examination security: A forensic examination must
be conducted under secure conditions [20]. The specific
expectations should be listed in the written contract. Fre-
quently, the security precautions required for access to vot-
ing systems and ballots (such as the two-persons present
at all times rule) should apply to the forensic team as well.
Depending on the nature of the examination, the neces-
sary security may require special secure environments
to be created in which to do the work, with key control,
video surveillance, guards, and so forth. The costs for
these arrangements must be borne by whatever agency is
in charge of the examination. Team members must also
protect the intellectual property of the vendor, particularly
any vendor-owned source code, both during and after the
examination. Finally, the examiners must take steps to
prevent any exploitable security vulnerabilities they may
discover from becoming public knowledge.
Technical resources: The forensic team will request
tools and resources as needed, and will need to receive
them in a timely manner. These requested resources are
almost certain to include the source code because that
is the set of commands for the computers under exami-
nation. Normally, all parties (officials, courts, vendors,
and others) should seek to expedite the review and sup-
ply the resources under their control. Any problems in
providing those resources will impact the delivery date
of the forensic report, and possibly damage its credibil-
ity. Contractually providing all parties with a mandatory
timetable and prompt follow up procedures when delays
occur may help keep the examination on track.
Role of vendors: The vendor’s important role was dis-
cussed above, but a few points will be reiterated here. The
forensic contract or an addendum contract between the
public agency and the vendor should specify the roles
the vendor will play, including the timetable for vendor
supply of specified resources, technical support, and per-
mission for team access to the source code and build
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environment. It should record the decision regarding the
sequencing of the vendor’s receipt of and opportunity to
respond to the forensic team report. The primary choices
are for the vendor to receive a draft with an opportunity
to respond to the forensics team pre-release, or to receive
a copy post-public release. Another clause should detail
how the vendor’s response will be treated (e.g., a posted
link accompanying the team’s web-posted report). The
contract should clarify the types of contact the team may
have with the vendor, and specify the terms for the arm’s-
length relationship with the vendor, including the vendor
having no role in the forensic team’s assessments other
than suggesting potential causes for the problem.
Vendor cooperation can greatly enhance the speed of
the forensic review and lower its costs [18, 17]. Such
cooperation can ultimately promote the vendor’s oppor-
tunities to benefit from the examination. Vendors who
quickly authorize source code review (under carefully con-
structed legal terms) and deliver the necessary materials
can profit from learning whether there is a problematic
point so that it can promptly be corrected for other ju-
risdictions/customers within the governing certification
regime. Public authorities can (and, we believe, should)
praise the vendor for speedy and complete cooperation in
the forensics review.
To further promote this arm’s-length relationship and
avoidance of conflicts of interest, the vendor should not
directly pay for the examination although, in some cases,
depending on the State and forensic conclusions, it may
be appropriate for government authorities to charge back
to the vendor part or all of the expenses.
Costs: The cost of an examination can vary widely, and
a budget must be agreed to as a part of the contract. The
cost will vary depending on who conducts the examina-
tion. A forensic or security firm may charge more than
academics who use the opportunity to involve graduate
students, but a private firm may be able to sign a contract
quickly. Costs, of course, rise with the complexity of
the examination, the security arrangements required, and
the travel necessitated. HAVA funds have been used for
voting equipment reviews so this may be one source of
financial support.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Forensic analysis is generally difficult [24]. In particular,
forensic analysis of e-voting machines poses many chal-
lenges. In comparison to traditional computer forensics, it
has more tradeoffs and even outright contradictions. It is
of course much more nuanced than auditing paper ballots,
although the high-level techniques are surprisingly simi-
lar. Recent history counsels that some jurisdictions will
continue to experience serious electoral complications
going forward. The job of the elections official has never,
we think, been more important.
It is no longer sufficient to rely on current technol-
ogy and practices. We must use not merely good design
and forensic practices but rather the rigor of high assur-
ance in design and analysis that would go into designing
mission-critical systems such as those on military aircraft
or satellites.
One of our future projects is to compare the require-
ments to how elections are run, and to focus on the design
and implementation requirements of both the process and
the machines to enable us to answer the questions that
we have posed. We are also looking at applying high
assurance techniques to e-voting, which will require an
analysis of the inherent contradictions of the requirements
for security, anonymity, and secrecy within the context of
the legal and technical policies of the election process.
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Appendix 1: Example of Nondisclosure
Agreement in Voting Equipment Review
From the California Top-to-Bottom Review (2007),
contract between the California Secretary of State and
the University of California but terms largely negotiated




Exhibit A, Section 11, page 10, relevant text:
No confidential information, record or data
identified as proprietary or confidential that is
provided or accessed that directly pertains or
exclusively relates to this voting system review
shall be discussed, published, disclosed, trans-
ferred or otherwise communicated outside the
scope of the voting system review. No confiden-
tial documents, files, papers, records, computer
disks, or other tangible matters containing such
proprietary or confidential data, files or records
shall be removed from secured locations with-
out express written permission of one of the
Principal Investigators. These confidentiality
restrictions shall apply only to material that is
received from the State and identified in writing
as confidential. The following information shall
not be considered confidential information for
the purposes of these restrictions: information
that was already known to the receiving party,
other than under an obligation of confidential-
ity, at the time of disclosure; or information that
is now or hereafter becomes publicly known by
other than a breach of the nondisclosure agree-
ments associated with this project. These re-
strictions shall not be construed to prevent team
members from conducting future research on
voting systems, possibly including the ones ex-
amined in this review, after the completion of
this project, so long as that research does not
improperly use confidential information gained
through this review. The Principal Investiga-
tor of each UC team shall be responsible for
requiring all members of the UC team, and any
other project participants, to execute acknowl-
edgements that they have read, understood and
agreed to abide by the terms and conditions
of this Statement of Work. Such executed ac-
knowledgement shall remain in effect for the
duration of the project even in the event of res-
ignation or termination of the UC team member
or participant. Upon completion of the final re-
port, all proprietary or confidential information,
data, and documentation, original and copies,
provided by the SOS to UC shall be returned
promptly to the attention. . . Secretary of State
. . .
Appendix 2: Partial List of Voting Systems
Studies
This appendix lists the studies of voting systems that are
known and available for public access. The components
of the voting systems listed are taken from the reports;
note that different reports may refer to the same system
in slightly different ways. Further, generic equipment
(such as generic memory cards and Ethernet cables and
switches) is omitted, even when listed in the reports. Each
entry has the name by which the report is commonly
referred. When projects have multiple reports, only the
lead report or reports are listed. All reports are available
on the listed web pages. Several reports, including some
forensic reviews in an election context, are listed at the
end but not in reverse chronological order or in the format
of the balance, as they were received as the paper was
going to press.
2008: Op Bravo/Scytl
Report: M. Clarkson, B. Hay, M. Inge, A, Shelat, D.
Wagner, and A. Yasinsac, “Software Review and Secu-
rity Analysis of Scytl Remote Voting Software,” Security
and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory,






• Pnyx.core ODBP 1.0 remote voting software
2007: Ohio EVEREST
Report: “Project EVEREST (Evaluation and Validation
of Election-Related Equipment, Standards, and Testing)
Risk Assessment Study of Ohio Voting Systems: Exec-
utive Report,” Office of the Secretary of State of Ohio,
Columbus, OH (Dec. 2007). Additional reports available





• Premier, consisting of:
– GEMS software version 1.18.24
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– AccuVote-TSX version 4.6.4
– AccuVote-OS 2000 Precinct Optical Scanner
version 1.96.6
– AccuVote-OS Central Optical Scanner version
2.0.12
– Digi Seriel to Ethernet Gateway version Port-
Server II
– VC Programmer ST100
– Mobile Electronic Poll Worker Tablet System
– Elections Media Processor System with Elec-
tions Media Drive Tower
– Voter Card Encoder Spyrus PAR2
• ES&S, consisting of:
– Unity Election Management Software version
3.0.1.1
– Automark 87000
– iVotronic DRE 90998-BI, 91057-BL, 93038-
BL
– Precinct Optical Scanner Model 100
– Central Optical Scanner Model 650
• Hart Intercivic, consisting of:
– BOSS, as provided by the Secretary of State
– Tally, as provided by the Secretary of State
– Rally, as provided by the Secretary of State
– Servo, as provided by the Secretary of State
– Trans, as provided by the Secretary of State
– Ballot on Demand, as provided by the Secre-
tary of State
– eCM Manager, as provided by the Secretary of
State
– eCM Token, as provided by the Secretary of
State
– JBC
– eSlate 3000 DRE version 4.0.1.9
– eScan Optical Scanner version 1.1.6
2007: Florida Diebold Supplemental Report, SAIT
Lab
Report: D. Gainey, M. Gerke, and A. Yasinsac, “Soft-
ware Review and Security Analysis of the Diebold Vot-
ing Machine Software: Supplemental Report”, Security
and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory,






• Diebold Voting System Software version 1.96.8
2007: Florida Diebold Report, SAIT Lab
Report: R. Gardner, A. Yasinsac, M. Bishop, T. Kohno,
Z. Hartley, J. Kerski, D. Gainey, R. Walega, E. Hollander,
and M. Gerke, “Software Review and Security Analysis
of the Diebold Voting Machine Software”, Security and
Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, Florida




• Diebold Optical Scan firmware version 1.96.8
• Diebold Touch Screen firmware version 4.6.5
• Diebold Touch Screen bootloader version 1.3.6
• Diebold GEMS software version 1.18.25
2007: California Top to Bottom Review, University of
California
Reports: M. Bishop, “Overview of Red Team Reports,”
Office of the Secretary of State of California, 1500 11th
St, Sacramento, CA 95814 (July 2007); D. Wagner, “Prin-
cipal Investigator’s Statement on Protection of Security-
Sensitive Information,” Office of the Secretary of State
of California, 1500 11th St, Sacramento, CA 95814 (Aug.
2007); and additional reports by vendor assignment by
teams focused on Source Code, Red Team, Documenta-
tion Reviews. An omnibus Accessibility report is avail-




• Diebold GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote, consisting of:
– GEMS software version 1.18.24
– AccuVote-TSX with AccuView Printer Module
and Ballot Station firmware version 4.6.4
– AccuVote-OS (Model D) with firmware ver-
sion 1.96.6
– AccuVote-OS Central Count with firmware ver-
sion 2.0.12
– AccuFeed
– Vote Card Encoder version 1.3.2
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– Key Card Tool software version 4.6.1
– VC Programmer software version 4.6.1
• Hart Intercivic System 6.2.1, consisting of:
– Ballot Now software version 3.3.11
– BOSS software version 4.3.13
– Rally software version 2.3.7
– Tally software version 4.3.10
– SERVO version 4.2.10
– JBC version 4.3.1
– eSlate/DAU version 4.2.13
– eScan version 1.3.14
– VBO version 1.8.3
– eCM Manager, version 1.1.7
• Sequoia WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-
C, consisting of:
– WinEDS version 3.1.012
– AVC Edge Model I firmware version 5.0.24
– AVC Edge Model II firmware version 5.0.24
– VeriVote Printer
– Optech 400-C/WinETP firmware version
1.12.4
– Optech Insight APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
– Optech Insight Plus APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
– Card Activator version 5.0.21
– HAAT Model 50 version 1.0.69L
– Memory Pack Reader (MPR) firmware version
2.15
2007: Center for Election Integrity, Cleveland State
University
Report: Thomas P. Ryan and Candice Hoke, Cleveland
State University GEMS Tabulation Database Design Is-




Voting System: Diebold GEMS software
2007: Kentucky Attorney General





• Hart Intercivic eSlate Voting System, software ver-
sion 6.2.1 and related components
• Diebold Election Systems, Inc. AccuVote Optical
Scan (“0s”) (model D) with firmware version 1.96.6,
Voter Card Encoder 1.3.2, AccuVote-OS Central
Count firmware version 2.0.12, Key Card Tool 4.6.1,
and VCProgrammer 4.6.1
• AccuVote-TSX DRE (Model D) Touch Screen with
Ballot Station firmware version 4.6.4
2007: University of Connecticut VoTeR Report
Report: A, Kiayias, L. Michel, A. Russell, and A.
Shvartsman, “Integrity Vulnerabilities in the Diebold TSX
Voting Terminal,” VoTeR Center, University of Connecti-





• Diebold AccuVote-TSx firmware version 4.6.4, boot-
loader version BLR7-1.2.1, Windows CE Operating
System version WCER-410.2.1
• Diebold GEMS server version 1.18
2006: University of California Hart Report
Report: E. Proebstel, S. Riddle, F. Hsu, J. Cummins,
F. Oakley, T. Stanionis, and M. Bishop, “An Analysis
of the Hart Intercivic DAU eSlate,” Proceedings of the
2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technol-





• Hart Intercivic eSlate version 6.1, consisting of:
– eSlate firmware version 4.1.3
– JBC firmware version 4.1.3
– VBO firmware version 1.7.5
2007: Florida CD-13 (SAIT Report)
Report: A. Yasinsac, D. Wagner, M. Bishop, T. Baker, B.
de Medeiros, G. Tyson, M. Shamos, and M. Burmester,
“Software Review and Security Analysis of the ES&S
iVotronic 8.0.1.2 Voting Machine Firmware,” Security
and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory,






• ES&S iVotronic firmware version8.0.1.2
2006: Diebold AccuBasic
Report: D. Wagner, D. Jefferson, M. Bishop, C. Karlof,
and N. Sastry, “Security Analysis of the Diebold Ac-
cuBasic Interpreter,” Technical Report, Voting Systems
Technology Assessment Advisory Board, Office of the






• Diebold AccuVote-OS with firmware version 1.96.6
• Diebold AccuVote-TSx with firmware version 4.6.4
2004: RABA Report
Report: RABA Innovative Solution Cell, “Trusted Agent
Report Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System,” RABA




• Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System
• Diebold GEMS server
2003: Compuware Report
Report: “Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical
Security Assessment Report,” Compuware Corporation,




• Diebold Election Systems, consisting of:
– AccuVote-TS R6 firmware version 4.3.15
– GEMS server version 1.18.18
• ES&S, consisting of:
– iVotronic version 7.4.5.0
– Unity Election System software version 2.2
• Hart InterCivic, consisting of:
– eSlate 3000 version 2.1
– JBC version 1.16
– BOSS Election Management Software version
2.9.04
– TALLY software version 2.9.08
– SERVO software version 1.0.2
• Sequoia Voting Systems, consisting of:
– AVC Edge version 4.1.D
– Card Activator version 4.2
– WinEDS Election Management Software ver-
sion 2.6
Additional Reviews (with thanks to Prof. Doug Jones
of the University of Iowa; this information will be orga-
nized for the next edition of this paper)
A forensics examination report for central-count mark-
sense tabulators in Maricopa County, Arizona:
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/˜jones/
voting/ArizonaDist20.pdf
A report on pre-election testing in Miami Dade County,
Florida, with sections on central-count mark-sense tab-
ulators and touch-screen machines, as well as general
remarks on test design.
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/˜jones/
voting/miamitest.pdf
Auditing elections – a discussion of how to do sanity
checks on election results and pin down discrepancies.
Forensic auditing clearly wants this, although I was more
interested in on-the-fly self-auditing during the process.
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/˜jones/
voting/cacm2004.shtml
Developing a Methodology for Observing Electronic
Voting, a report from the Carter Center, includes Prof.
Jones’ talk on perspectives on electronic voting. This
provides a framework for thinking about not only observ-
ing (the Carter Center’s interest) but also forensic inves-
tigation. Forensic investigators will want the answers
to essentially all the questions on the Carter Center’s
work sheets. http://www.cartercenter.org/
documents/elec_voting_oct11_07.pdf (Re-
published in extended form in From Power Outages to
Paper Trails, IFES).
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